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NOTES
A Proposed Revision of the Warsaw Convention
The Warsaw Convention' is a treaty which permits an international
airline to limit its liability for the deathor injury of a passenger. 2 Ratified
by Congress in 1929, the Convention's main purpose was to protect the
fledgling airline industry from the devastating effects' of unlimited liability
for air disasters." Today, more than fifty years following its adoption, the
treaty remains in effect, despite both the financial stability of the airlines
and evidence that air travel is the safest mode of transportation available.5
The existence of a stable and safe airline industry suggests that the
treaty's main purpose has been achieved, and that continued enforcement
of the liability limitation is unwarranted.
In response to the questionable fairness of the liability limitation, a
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transporta-
tion by Air, opened for signature October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S.
11 (United States ratification effective as of October 29, 1934) [hereinafter cited as Warsaw
Convention].
I In its original form, the treaty limited a plaintiff's recovery to 125,000 Poincare francs,
which is $8,300 in United States currency. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22(1).
Depending on which amendment (or amendments) are adhered to by the country in which
the court hearing the suit is situated, this recovery limit may either remain at $8,300 or
be raised to $16,600 (as a result of the Hague Protocol, opened for signature August 1,
1963, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 (United States not a signatory)), $75,000 (the result of the Agree-
ment Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol,
CAB Docket 17325, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as the Montreal Agree-
ment]) or $100,000 ((due to the Guatemala Protocol, ICAO Doc. No. 8878-L.C. 161-162) (1970)
(United States not a signatory at time of this writing)).
I For instance, the fatality rate in 1929 was 45 persons for every 100 million passenger
miles flown. 1965 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
(ICAO) COUNCIL TO THE ICAO ASSEMBLY 13 [hereinafter cited as 1965 ICAO REP.]; In re Air
Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 1978); 2 J. KENNELLY, LITIGA-
TION AND TRIAL OF AIR CRASH CASES, Ch. 7, at 5 (1968); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The U.S.
and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REv. 497, 498 (1967).
4 Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 917 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1114 (1979); Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1085 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
922 (1977); Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 327 (5th Cir. 1967);
In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp 1114, 1118-19 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Lowenfeld
& Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 499; Note, The Interpretation of the' Warsaw Convention
in Wrongful Death Actions, 3 FORDHAM INT'L L.F. 71, 74-75 (1979). There was a second pur-
pose for the implementation of the Warsaw Convention: The signatories to the treaty were
desirous of developing uniform systems for litigation and travel arrangements. Id.
I See note 26 infra.
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number of courts8 have accepted legal theories which permit a plaintiff
to circumvent the Convention and recover an amount in excess of the
current $75,000 limit.! The executive branch of the government, upon
which the Constitution places the responsibility for the negotiation of and
adherence to treaties,' has neither condemned the courts for their actions
nor reaffirmed a desire to remain signatory to the treaty.' This note con-
tends, however, that despite the desirability of adequate compensation
' See Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1114 (1979); Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977);
Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967); Mertens v. Flying
Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965); LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344
F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965); Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965);
Pekelis v. Transcontinential & W. Air, Inc., 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1951); American Airlines,
Inc. v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949); In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp.
1114 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y.),
affd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), affd by an equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968); Grey
v. American Airlines, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), affd, 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956).
For the source of the limit, see note 2 supra. Some of the methods of avoidance in-
clude: finding the treaty unconstitutional, e.g., Burdell v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, 10 Av.
Cas. 18, 151 (111. Cir. Ct. 1968), amended, 11 Av. Cas. 17, 351 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1969) (changing
ground for finding nonimposition from unconstitutionality to lack of "international transpor-
tation" which would make the treaty applicable); finding an airline employee committed
an act which, although if committed by the carrier itself would have insulated the carrier
from liability, allowed the plaintiff to recover complete damages from the employee per-
sonally, e.g., Pierre v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 486, 489 (D.N.J. 1957); but see
Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977); Chutter v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 132
F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); (this controversy was later clarified by the Hague Protocol,
supra note 2, which provides for insulation from liability for carriers as well as their agents,
Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d at 1086.); finding that the carrier or its agents committed an act
of willful misconduct, e.g., LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir.
1965); Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N. V. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v. Tuller,
292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961); American Airlines v. Ulen, 186
F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949); finding that a ticket was not delivered on time, e.g., Mertens
v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965); Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.,
352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965); finding that the ticket, although delivered, contained an inade-
quate warning about the liability limitation, e.g., Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A.,
253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y.), -affjd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), affd by an equally divided
court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968); or finding that the passenger's survivors were not in privity
with the airline and therefore not bound by the limitation contained in the contract, e.g.,
In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 states that it is the power of the executive branch of the
government to make treaties.
' In fact, in 1965 the United States government displayed its dissatisfaction with the
low liability limitation of the Warsaw Convention and its progeny by filing notice that
it intended to denounce the treaty. In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114,
1118-19 (C.D. Cal. 1978); 2 J. KENNELLY, supra note 3, at 33-34; 1 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE,
AVIATION TORT LAW S 11:19 (1978); Hickey, Breaking the Limit-Liability for Willful Miscon-
duct Under the Guatemala Protocol, 42 J. AIR. L. & COM. 603, 612 (1976); Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 497; Note, supra note 4, at 78. The denunciation prompted
negotiation of what is now termed the Montreal Agreement, supra note 2. In re Air Crash
in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. at 1118-19; 2 J. KENNELLY, supra note 3, at 10-14, 33-34;
1 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW (rev'd. 1977); 1 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, supra, at
§ 11:19; Boyle, The Guatemala Protocol, 6 AKRON L. REV. 123, 125 (1973); Lowenfeld &
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which can result from avoidance of the Convention's restrictions, the
judicial activism practiced by the courts might be overly zealous and could
lead to unintended results."
After an analysis of the basic problems with the treaty and the most
popular theories of avoidance, this note concludes that although the
recovery system is outdated and must be changed, its alteration is not
the prerogative of the judiciary. Two original proposals are then
presented. The first suggests that the appropriate conduct for the judiciary
is to await executive action on the issue of the liability limitation. The
second proposes an amendment of the treaty's recovery system whereby
the level of an airline's liability becomes commensurate with its financial
status.
TREATY PROBLEMS AND POPULAR MODES OF AVOIDANCE
Treaty Problems
The inequitable aspects of the Warsaw Convention's recovery system
are attributable to three basic problems: first, because a contract for air
travel is between two parties of grossly disparate bargaining powers, most
of the advantages in the contract accrue to the airline; second, due to
the vast changes which have occurred in the safety of air travel, the treaty
is no longer as essential for the protection of the interest of either the
airlines or their passengers; third, the current operation of the liability
limitation results in an unfair financial burden upon certain defendants
in air crash cases.
The first problem, inequality of bargaining power, violates the basic
principle of contract law that parties should be able to contract freely.
The assumption underlying that principle is that the parties to a con-
tract are of equal bargaining power and are able to achieve the results
they desire at a price that is both fair and equitable." The purchase of
an airline ticket, however, is inconsistent with this assumption, because
Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 497; Note, supra note 4, at 78. The Montreal Agreement in-
creases the liability for all flights of signatory airlines which originate, stop over, or ter-
minate in the United States. Montreal Agreement, supra note 1. The uniqueness of the
Montreal Agreement lies in the fact that it is not a treaty among nations. Rather, it is
a contractual agreement between the United States government and the airlines that main-
tain flights which terminate, originate, or stop over in the United States. Flights which
have any one of these characteristics are subject to the $75,000 liability limitation. In re
Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. at 1118-19; 2 J. KENNELLY, supra note 3, at 10-16;
1 L. KREINDLER, supra, at S 12A.02; 1 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, supra, at S 11:19. For a more
extensive discussion of the events surrounding the negotiation for the Montreal Agree-
ment, see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 497-502.
," See note 73 & accompanying text infra.




all terms of passage are predetermined. 3 The passenger is unable to
bargain with the airline for the terms of transportation. Even if the op-
portunity to bargain were available, it would be highly improbable that
a private individual could induce an airline to forgo the benefit of the
liability limitation. 4
Since the bargaining power of the two contracting parties is grossly
disparate, the ticket results, for the most part, in certain inequitable terms
of passage. '5 While a few elements of the contract provide an equitable
distribution of benefits and detriments between the passenger and the
airline,' those terms are not explicitly addressed within the body of the
Convention.17 When the airline's benefit is weighed against its detriment,
the former far exceeds the latter. 8
The second problem stems from the changes which have occurred in
the airline industry. Originally, the drafters intended a quid pro quo ex-
change of benefits and detriments between the airline and the passengers."
"3 The terms of passage contained in the ticket include the place and date of issue, the
place of departure and of destination, the agreed stopping places, the name and address
of the carrier or carriers, and a statement concerning the liability limitation. Warsaw Con-
vention, supra note 1, art. 3(1).
" A private individual simply does not have the power to force the airline to increase
its liability. Article 22(1) of the Convention, which gives a passenger the right to bargain
with the carrier for a higher recovery, is at best an empty promise. Warsaw Convention,
supra note 1, art. 29(1). An example of the potential powerlessness of a single individual
against an airline is the Montreal Agreement, supra note 2. There, the threat of the United
States government to withdraw from the Warsaw Convention was required before the
airlines would agree to increase their liability. For a more complete discussion of the events
surrounding the Montreal Agreement, see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3. See also
2 J. KENNELLY, supra note 3. There may be counterarguments for prohibiting an individual
from bargaining for his terms of passage, such as lack of uniformity (which was one of
the major purposes of the Warsaw Convention), Benjamins v. British European Airways,
572 F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979), and confusion which
would result from airline ticket agents needing to bargain or explain each element of the
contract, Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 370 F.2d 508, 515 (2d Cir. 1966) (Moore,
J., dissenting).
,S The inequitable terms of passage are all those contained in the ticket in which there
is not an equal distribution of benefits and detriments between the airline and the passenger.
The contract, when weighed as a whole, is inequitable to the passenger. The terms of passage
are only a part of the inequity; the recovery terms also are inequitable. See notes 18-32
& accomparlying text infra.
"S The one quid pro quo exchange of benefits and detriments is that the passenger pays
a fee and is transported by the carrier to the destination he desires. Block v. Compagnie
Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 330-31 (5th Cir. 1967).
1 Transportation per se is only mentioned in article 1, Warsaw Convention, supra note
1, art. i, wheie it is defined, and in article 2, id, art. 2, which states that the Convention
applies to transportation performed by the state.
" The benefit mentioned in the treaty which favors the airline is the liability limitation
of article 22(1), id. art. 22(1). The airline's corresponding detriment, the presumption of
liability, is contained in article 17, id. art. 17.
19 Block v. Compagnie Nationple Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 327 (5th Cir. 1967); Lisi v.
Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.pA., 253 F. Supp. 237, (S.D.N.Y.), affjd, 370 F2d 508, 512-13
(2d Cir. 1P66), aff'd by an equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968); cf. Note, Aviation Law:
Attempts.'to Cqicumvent the Limitations of Liability Imposed on Injured Passengers by the
[Vol. 57:297
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An examination of ticket prices" and aviation accident litigation2"
demonstrates that, currently, the exchange is not equal.' The airlines
argue that reasonable and stable travel costs and favorable proof presump-
tions which insure swift and certain recoveries are great benefits to the
traveler.' They contend that these advantages are sufficiept to justify
limited recovery,' and argue that without the benefit of the liability limita-
tion, insurance costs become unreasonable." The carriers conclude by ex-
plaining that the rise in insurance rates attributable to unlimited liability
would greatly increase air fares' and eliminate potential passengers whose
Warsaw Convention, 54 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 851, 852 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Avia-
tion Law] (explaining that presumption of liability was created to justify low liability limita-
tion); Note, supra note 4, at 76. The passenger benefits by being able to arrange his flight
for a fairly reasonable sum, Note, Aviation Law, supra, at 863, and by the guarantee of
a swift and certain recovery in the event of an accident, Boyle, supra note 9, at 123; Hickey,
supra note 9, at 608; Note, Aviation Law, supra, at 863. The corresponding detriment to
the passenger is the limited liability enjoyed by the airline. Boyle, supra note 9, at 123;
Hickey, supra note 9, at 608. To its detriment, the airline agrees to either a presumption
of liability for the accident, Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17, if the situation is
covered by the Warsaw Convention, or absolute liability under the Montreal Agreement,
supra note 2. The airline benefits from its limited liability.
I The airlines argue that the liability limitation helps keep ticket prices stable, Note,
Aviation Law, supra note 19, at 863, because insurance costs, which are a part of the ticket
price, are much easier to calculate if the rate of recovery is fixed. Hickey, supra note 9,
at 612; Note, Aviation Law, supra note 19, at 863; Note, supra note 4, at 75. See note 28
& accompanying text infra.
I, In a suit governed by the Warsaw Convention, the airline is presumed liable, Warsaw
Convention, supra note 1, art. 17. This shifts the burden of proof to the airline to show
that it was not negligent. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 500. In suits governed
by the Hague Protocol, supra note 2, or the Montreal Agreement, supra note 2, the airline
is held strictly liable. In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114, 1119 (C.D.
Cal. 1978); 2 J. KENNELLY, supra note 3, ch. 7, at 10; Boyle, supra note 9, at 125; Note, Avia-
tion Law, supra note 19, at 853.
Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 370 F.2d 508, 512-13 (2d Cir. 1966), affJd
by an equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968). See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note
3, at 500.
See notes 20-21 supra.
24 Note, Aviation Law, supra note 19, at 851-52.
Hickey, supra note 9, at 610.
, Note, Aviation Law, supra note 19, at 864. The contentions that insurance rates and
ticket prices would become unreasonable if liability became unlimited are unfounded when
examined in light of current data concerning overall airline costs and factors which deter-
mine insurance premiums. In 1966, the Montreal Agreement, supra note 2, increased the
liability limitation of nearly every international airline with United States flights to $75,000.
In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1978); 2 J. KENNELLY,
supra note 3, ch. 7, at 10; Boyle, supra note 9, at 125; Note, Aviation Law, supra note
19, at 853. Following that increase, insurance costs of those carriers rose approximately
$.06 per passenger, Hickey, supra note 9, at 611, which in total remained only one percent
or less of their total operating expense. Id. As two international legal scholars observed,
"It]he incremental insurance costs ... were clearly somewhere between the cost of the
olive and the cost of the gin in the martini, and nowhere near the cost of an inflight movie."
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 567.
At the February 1978 Symposium on Aviation Litigation held in Monaco, it was reported
that, in 1977, United States airlines paid roughly $.40 per passenger per round trip for
liability insurance of up to $400 million per occurrence. 1 L. KREINDLER, supra9, S 12B.01.
1982]
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ability to travel by air is predicated on costY
The advantages named by the airlines and intended by the drafters-
stable air fares and favorable proof presumptions -today either do not
exist or do not need the treaty to assure their enforcement. Airline ticket
prices for international travel have not remained stable,28 so the traveler
Since 90% of these flights were domestic, id. S 12B.02[41, and therefore, subject to unlimited
liability, Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 370 F.2d 508, 513 (2d Cir. 1966), affd
by an equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968); Kreindler, The Guatemala Protocol, 6 AKRON
L. REV. 131, 135 (1973), it cannot be assumed that the insurance costs of international car-
riers, because they enjoy limited liability, are equivalent to that of their domestic counter-
parts. Rather, due to the liability limitation, it can be expected that the cost per passenger
per round trip is less than the $.40 figure given for the domestic airlines.
Knowledge of the price paid for insurance by the United States airlines is helpful in
two ways. First, it provides the international airlines with an estimate of the cost of in-
surance for unlimited liability. Second, it demonstrates that, if unlimited liability were to
be imposed on the international carriers, insurance would be available to protect them
from financial catastrophe. It may therefore be assumed that an elimination of the liability
limitation would not impose upon international airlines a burden of unmanageable insurance
costs.
In addition, there are other reasons which justify the assumption that unlimited liabili-
ty will not produce exhorbitant insurance premiums. The strongest reason for the belief
is found in the domestic airlines. They are charged with unlimited liability, yet remain
some of the most viable industries in the world. Kreindler, supra at 132, 135. Their con-
tinued success may be due to the fact that insurance premiums are based on the estimated
risk of accident combined with an estimated average recovery to be paid to victims. Hickey,
supra note 9, at 612. The risk is calculated on past air safety records, taking into account
the climate and technical standards of equipment and facilities used by the airline. Id. Because
air travel is statistically proven to be the safest form of transportation now in existence,
risk of accident is very low (airline travel is now considered the safest method of transport,
A.O.P.A. HANDBOOK FOR PILOTS (1977)). For example, in 1929 the fatality rate for every 100
million passenger miles flown was 45, and by 1965, that had been reduced to 0.55 for the
same distance. 1965 ICAO REP., supra note 3, at 13. In 1976 that figure had been further
reduced to 0.21 deaths per 100 million passenger miles. INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT
ASS'N, WORLD AIR TRANSPORT STATISTICS 14 (21st ed. 1976). This compares with 3.31 deaths
per 100 million passenger miles driven in the United States alone in 1976. NATIONAL SAFETY
COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 40 (1977 ed.). Also, due to technical advancements, airline safety
is expected to continue its improvement. Hickey, supra note 9, at 612.
The estimated average recovery is the factor which causes concern in determining the
premium rate. In 1970 the average recovery for a non-Warsaw-limited airline death was
$200,000, and statistics demonstrate that it is continually rising. 1 L. KREINDLER, supra,
note 9, S 12B.02[b]. For airlines, the continued increase may not, however, be a cause for
alarm. In 1977 those airlines which were incurring $200,000 liabilities for air disaster deaths
still only paid $.40 per passenger for liability insurance. Id. § 12B.01. If it is proposed that
unlimited liability exist solely for American victims and survivors, the cause for concern
is further reduced. Between 1963 and 1973, the average number of United States citizens
who died every year in plane crashes was 186. Kreindler, supra, at 132. That includes
deaths in domestic and international flights. Therefore, if the airlines were to incur unlimited
liability for American citizens, they would be facing such a burden for an average of fewer
than 186 persons per year. The increase seems even less when it is realized that the American
market represents a large percentage of all international air travel, 1 L. KREINDLER, supra
note 9, S 12B.02[4], which suggests that the airlines receive most of their profits from United
States citizens.
' See notes 20 & 26 supra for reasons why the airlines say the cost would increase
and a refutation of that argument.
" See DELTA AIRLINES 1980 ANNUAL REPORT: 52 MooDrS INVESTORS SERVICE, INC., MOODY'S
TRANSPORTATION NEWS REPORTS, 2329 (1981); Hearings Before the Subcomm. onAviation of the
[Vol. 57:297
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has not benefited from static costs. Due to the high safety ratings accorded
air travel,' as well as to the applicable treaties, a question of fault is
rarely litigated in a present-day air accident suit. Because the courts
almost uniformly eliminate the question of fault,3' it seems that judges,
rather than the treaty, impose the advantages of either a presumption
of fault or absolute liability.2 This demonstrates that it is no longer
necessary for the treaty to be in existence for the plaintiff to obtain a
favorable proof presumption.
The third problem with the Warsaw Convention is the unfair burden
it places on aircraft manufacturers if one of the causes of the crash is
mechanical failure. Since the manufacturer is outside the scope of the
treaty,' it is subject to unlimited liability. The result of limited airline
liability when manufacturers of the airplane or its component parts are
partially responsible for the accident is that nonairline defendants bear
the brunt of the compensation burden without regard to their degree of
fault.' One argument is that this is an acceptable consequence, since it
results in adequate compensation for plaintiffs and enables the courts to
grant unlimited liability against certain defendants and still allow the
United States to continue to adhere to the Warsaw Convention. Since
tort law looks favorably on imposing liability on parties who are in a good
position to absorb the cost and then pass it on to many customers, 5 the
airline manufacturers could be considered proper defendants from which
to extract unlimited compensation. 8
Comm. on Public Works and Transportation on H.R. 5481, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1979)
(statement of the Civil Aeronautics Board). A large part of the price increase is a reflec-
tion of the rising costs of fuel. The airlines, however, use the price stability argument
as a primary reason for maintaining the limitation, saying the costs would increase to even
greater amounts without it. Note, Aviation Law, supra note 19, at 863. The increase at-
tributable to greater insurance costs, however, would be approximately $.40. See note 26
supra.
The airline might argue that if the passenger desires greater financial protection, the
passenger should purchase insurance. Note, Aviation Law, supra note 19, at 864. That is
allegedly the purpose of. the notice requirement contained in the treaty. Warsaw Conven-
tion, supra note 1, art. 3(1)(e). See also notes 74-84 & accompanying text infra. The cost
per passenger for extra insurance, however, is greater when purchased individually, because
the airline can buy in bulk and thereby obtain a cheaper rate. 1 L. KREINDLER, supra note
9, S 11.01[5]. It is more efficient to require the airlines to purchase additional insurance
because they can spread the extra cost among all the passengers.
See note 26 supra.
Note, Aviation Law, supra note 19, at 865. See also note 21, supra.
3, Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 521-22; Note, Aviation Law, supra note
19, at 865.
3 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 521-22; Note, Aviation Law, supra note
19, at 865.
1 In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 747 (C.D. Cal. 1975); 2 J.
KENNELLY, supra note 3, ch. 7, at 2.
m J. KENNELLY, supra note 3, ch. 7, at 20; Hickey, supra note 9, at 604.
33 1 L. KREINDLER, supra note 9, S 11.0115]; Hickey, supra note 9, at 606-07; Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 559.
- The contention that plaintiffs should receive their compensation in unlimited amounts
1982]
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The assumption that unlimited liability and therefore adequate com-
pensation results from impleading a manufacturer where legally ap-
propriate is not always true, however. Due to certain legal difficulties,
it is harder to succeed against the manufacturer in litigation." When a
plaintiff sues an airline, he is guaranteed either a presumption of liability3
or strict liability39 against the carrier. Since the manufacturer is not bound
by any of the agreements which guarantee these favorable proof
presumptions," the plaintiff is never assured that the court will employ
them." Another legal barrier to suing the manufacturer instead of the
airline is that each state has its own products liability legislation,42 and
the application of any or all of the presumptions in the particular state
court is often dependent on the theory upon which the plaintiff proceeds.4 3
Plaintiff compensation, although limited, is therefore practically insured
by the Warsaw Convention, whereas recovery from a manufacturer, albeit
unlimited, is not so certain.
While data demonstrate that, financially" and numerically,45 the air-
craft manufacturers are the best risk spreaders, the airlines are also
from the aircraft manufacturers is based on the belief that the manufacturers are the best
risk spreaders. See text accompanying note 35 supra. The reasoning is that manufacturers
can charge higher prices for their planes, which would pass the cost of unlimited liability
on to the airlines. The airlines, in turn, could raise their ticket prices to represent the
increased cost of the aircraft. The system's positive aspect is that it would distribute the
price of some air transportation defendant's unlimited liability among the entire air travel-
ing industry and public. The system's negative result, however, is that it does not deter
the defendant airline, in whose hands lies the power to reduce air crashes and thus decrease
the volume of unlimited liability claims.
31 1 L. KREINDLER, supra note 9, S 7.01.
See note 21 supra.
See id.
40 See text accompanying note 33 supra.
4 See generally 2 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, supra, note 9, SS 19:5-19:12.
42 Id. § 19:12, at 519-20.
1 Id. For instance, strict liability is almost uniformly applied when a plaintiff is claim-
ing that a design was defective, id. S 19:5, at 492. But even when strict liability is applied,
a plaintiff may lose. See generally Collins v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 558 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1977);
Rigby v. Beech Aircraft Co., 548 F.2d 288 (10th Cir. 1977; Wangeman v. General Dynamics
Corp., 53 A.D.2d 520, 384 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1976). Some other theories which plaintiffs employ
against the manufacturers are breach of implied warranty, Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation,
Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d
432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963), or express warranty, Alaska Airlines, Inc. v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 430 F. Supp. 134 (D. Alaska 1977); Motorola Aviation Elec. Inc.
v. Louisiana Aircraft, Inc., 172 So. 2d 118 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 247 La. 717, 174 So.
2d 131 (1965), and failure to warn the operator adequately of certain features or safety
measures for the plane, Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973);
Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
" The profits of McDonnell-Douglas Corp. in 1979 alone were $199.1 million. MCDON-
NELL DOUGLAS CORP., 1979 ANNUAL REPORT; From 1975-1979, four of the major United States
airlines-Delta, Eastern, TWA, and American-each earned an average of $48 million in
annual profits. See DELTA AIRLINES, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT; EASTERN AIRLINES, 1979 ANNUAL
REPORT; AMERICAN AIRLINES, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT; TWA, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT.
4" There are over one hundred international airlines in existence today. See INTERNA-
TIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASS'N, supra note 26,.at 2, 14. The major aircraft manufacturers, who
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eminently capable of bearing the risk of unlimited liability. The court in
Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co.46 determined that the amendments
to the treaty demonstrate that the drafters thought the airlines could
absorb the cost of unlimited liability and then pass the cost on to their
passengers. 47 The airlines are particularly appropriate objects of tort
liability in light of the goal of deterring conduct that causes accidents.48
Manufacturer liability for air accidents does not spur the airlines to re-
quire more thorough flight preparation by pilots. Since pilot error is the
most frequent cause of air accidents,49 the airlines have the greatest
opportunity to try to prevent even those few accidents which do occur.,
The tort law objective of deterrence is therefore best served by impos-
ing unlimited liability on the airlines as well as on manufacturers.
Modes of Avoidance
The judiciary's dislike for the liability limitation of the Warsaw Con-
vention, due to both its unfairness and its obsolescence, has resulted in
three theories which enable judges to permit plaintiffs to recover
unrestricted amounts from defendant airlines. One theory finds its basis
in contract law.51 The two other theories are based on the treaty itself,
which allows unlimited recovery in cases of willful misconduct by an airline
or failure to give notice of the limitation to the passenger.2 This section
discusses the reasoning of each of the theories and the positive and
negative results of their application.
Contract Analysis
The reasoning behind the contract cases' begins with the basic princi-
sell the planes to these airlines, are Boeing, Lockheed and McDonnell-Douglas. The three
manufacturers therefore have over one hundred airlines among which the risk of unlimited
liability may be spread. The airlines can also pass the cost of liability on to the passengers.
Liability of the manufacturers thereby creates a longer chain of risk spreading and numerical-
ly allows more people to shoulder the burden of unlimited liability.
" 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973).
" Id. at 707.
" W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS, S 1, at 4-6 (4th ed. 1971).
"1 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, [1968] ANNUAL REVIEW OF AIRCRAFT ACCI-
DENT DATA 12 (1980).
See 351 F. Supp. at 707.
, The contract theory rests on the principle of privity, that principle being that parties
not in privity of contract are not bound by the contract's terms. J. MURRAY, supra note
11, 5 285, at 581-84.
" The willful misconduct theory is based on article 25 of the treaty. Warsaw Conven-
tion, supra note 1, art. 25. The ticket delivery mode of avoidance is based on articles 3(1)
and (2) of the treaty. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1), (2).
0 The main contract case is In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114 (C.D.
Cal. 1978). Other cases which stated that the ticket represented a contract between the
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ple that the ticket represents the contract between the passenger and
the airline." In In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia,55 the district court
used the above premise in combination with the California wrongful death
statute56 to demonstrate in a unique way that plaintiffs were not in a
position to be bound by the Convention's restriction.' The court reasoned
that since the decedents contracted with the airline for transportation,
they accepted the liability limitation imposed by the Warsaw Convention5
and thereby contracted away their right to recover any amount in excess
of the limitation. The court held that plaintiffs, as survivors of the deceased
passengers, were not parties to the contract and were not bound by the
Convention's restrictions.,9 The California wrongful death statute created
for the decedent's survivors an original cause of action that, according
to the court, did not depend on any rights the decedent might have had.,0
Thus plaintiffs were not bound by any waiver of rights by the decedent
and were permitted to recover damages in excess of the Warsaw Con-
vention limitation.6
The positive aspect of the Bali-type contract analysis is that, as with
all the other modes of avoidance, plaintiffs have the opportunity for ade-
quate compensation. Since many states have wrongful death statutes
similar to that of California, 2 judges who can find no act of willful
airline and the passenger include Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323
(5th Cir. 1967) and Glenn v. Compania Cubana de Aviacion, S.A., 102 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.
Fla. 1952). After 1967 the contract mode of avoidance was abandoned until the Bali deci-
sion for those theories which were more directly based on the treaty, see note 7 supra.
' Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 915 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1114 (1979); Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 330-31 (5th
Cir. 1967); In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114, 1119-21 (C.D. Cal. 1978);
1 L. KREINDLER, supra note 9, S 11.0511].
462 F. Supp. 1114 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE S 377 (West Supp. 1982).
5 The Bali court's method of avoidance was unique in that it combined the previous
contract theory, see note 53 supra, with the California wrongful death statute. 462 F. Supp.
at 1117.
'Id.
Id. at 1122, 1124.
Id. at 1117, 1122, 1124.
6' The damages awarded one plaintiff were $300,000. Another received $651,500. Id. at
1116, 1126.
6" Twenty-six states in addition to California create an original cause of action in their
wrongful death statutes. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 12-611
(1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. S 27-906 (1979); COLO. REV. STAT. S 13-21-202 (1973); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 663-3 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 5-311 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, S 1 (Smith-Hurd 1959); IND.
CODE S 34-1-1-2 (1976); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1972); MD. CTS & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. S 3-904 (1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, S 2 (1974); MISS. CODE ANN. S 11-71-13 (Supp.
1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. S 537-080 (Vernon Supp. 1982); NEv. REV. STAT. § 41.085 (1979); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-1 (West 1952); N.C. GEN. STAT. S 28A-18-2 (Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. S 2125.01 (Page Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, S 1053 (West Supp. 1981); OR. REV.
STAT. § 30.020 (1981); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, S 8301 (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE § 15-51-10
(1976); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. S 21-5-1 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. S 78-11-12 (1953); VA. CODE
§ 8.01-50 (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.20.010 (1962); W. VA. CODE S 55-7-5 (1981).
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misconduct,' no inadequate ticket delivery,4 and no faulty notice s could
still allow plaintiffs unlimited recovery through the contract and wrongful
death statute theory.
6 6
There are also negative aspects to the Bali approach to the limitation.
Widespread forum shopping could result,"' contravening the purpose of
uniformity.' With the opportunity for greater application of this avoidance
theory,69 diplomatic objections from other member nations might be
forthcoming. 0 Finally, the Bali court, in its zeal, seems to have commit-
ted an error which, given the overall tone of the opinion, it probably did
not intend." The privity interpretation protects survivors of passengers
from the liability limitation, yet it holds the passengers to the contract.
If a passenger was therefore able to survive the crash, the Bali inter-
pretation would be of no aid in avoiding the limitation.' This demonstrates
the dangers inherent in judicial activisim, and justifies the constitutional
ban on such activities.
7 3
0 See notes 90-94 & accompanying text infra.
" See notes 74-80 & 84-88 & accompanying text infra.
See notes 74-78 & 81-88 & accompanying text infra.
Note, supra note 4, at 72-73.
' One writer has argued that continuous judicial reinterpretation of the treaty's terms
promotes forum shopping. Mankiewicz, The Judicial Diversifwcation of Uniform Private Law
Conventions 21 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 718, 745 (1972). Plaintiffs could have a choice of forums
in which to sue, those with California-type wrongful death statutes and those with statutes
which do not create an original cause of action. See note 62 supra. There is also the possibility
that different judges will have different attitudes toward the importance of adherence to
the liability limitation. If forum shopping were permitted without jurisdictional limitations,
a plaintiff could always be allowed to sue in a court which had the appropriate type of
wrongful death statute and a judge who frowned upon imposition of the liability limitation.
Litigation, however, does have jurisdictional requirements, and there is a possibility that
a plaintiff could be procedurally restricted to a court whose statute lacked the original
cause of action provision or to a judge who believed in adhering to the limitation.
" See note 4 & accompanying text supra.
"' The contract theory employed by the Bali court presents greater opportunities for
application because of the number of states with wrongful death statutes similar to that
of California. See note 62 & accompanying text supra. See also Note, supra note 4, at 72-73.
71 Note, supra note 4, at 77. The problem of foreign relations difficulties, however, was
also a problem in 1965 when the United States first contemplated denouncing the treaty,
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 510, yet the fear did not deter the government
from threatening denunciation in order to force an increase in the recovery allowed to
victims and survivors of air accidents. See generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3.
"' The court, in a number of places, indicated its overall dislike for the liability limita-
tion, and intimated that its usefulness had long since passed. For instance, the court argued
that, because of technological and safety developments, "[t]here is now a strong factual
basis for the argument that a legal limitation on the amount a plaintiff may recover in
the event of an air tragedy is unwarranted." 462 F. Supp. at 1125. Judge Williams also
contended that legislation such as the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 demonstrated the
federal government's intent that the airline industry "stand on [its] own feet" and take
"responsibility for damages caused by its own negligence." Id. The antilimitation senti-
ment displayed by the court suggests that it would not approve of limited liability for
an air crash victim.
' See text accompanying note 64 supra.
, The Constitution provides that the President has the power to make treaties. U.S.
CONST. art. II, 5 2, cl. 2. Also, in article VI the Constitution states that "all tLeaties made,
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Lack of Notice and Failure of Delivery
Article 3(1)" 4 requires that the airline deliver to the passenger a ticket
or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby ...." U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 2. The Bali court, by not adhering to the treaty, which was allegedly made
under the authority of the United States (for a discussion contending the Warsaw Conven-
tion was not so negotiated, see Note, Aviation Law, supra note 19, at 855 & n.36), could
be said to have violated both articles II and VI. The .article VI violation would be
nonadherence, and the article II violation would be rewriting the treaty to include a privity
requirement.
The judicial treaty-making problem can also be looked upon as a question of proper
judicial conduct in light of statute obsolescence. The Warsaw Convention, as a federal treaty,
has the force of federal law. Smith v. Canadian Pac. Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 801 (2d
Cir. 1971); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Federal law, as enacted by the Congress, is binding on
"the judges in every State .... U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. There is a problem, however,
when statutes become obsolete. Unlike the common law, courts cannot change outdated
statutes by judicial decision. Davies, A Response to Statutory Obsolescence: The Non-Primacy
of Statutes Act, 4 VT. L. REv. 203, 213 (1979). Only the legislature has the power to alter and
update statutes. Id. This is enough of a difficulty on the state or federal level, but an even
greater problem is posed for alteration of an international treaty. Much more time is needed
for the negotiation of international rules. The increased time results in harm to a greater
number of people because the obsolete treaty is enforced for a longer period of time.
The problem with obsolete statutes which remain in force is that judges, in despair
over the inordinate amount of time required for reformation, become more and more creative
in their interpretation of the statute. Courts look at the conditions which prompted enact-
ment of the legislation in the first place, hnd compare those conditions with the present
situation. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1088 (2d Cir. 1977). Often judges will look to more
recent legislation in the area which represents the modern prevailing legislative opinion
on the topic, see, e.g., In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. at 1125-26, and at-
tempt to decide the case in accordance with that opinion.
In the United States, judges have pointed to both federal legislation, e.g., id. at 1125-26
(relying on The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-448, 92 Stat. 1073), and
other judicial decisions, e.g., 462 F. Supp. at 1122 (relying on Grey v. American Airlines,
95 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 253 F. Supp.
237 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), afj'd by an equally divided court, 390 U.S.
455 (1968); and Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965), among other
cases), to explain their liberal construction of the treaty. Their unorthodox interpretation,
however, could easily lead to unfavorable repercussions, such as embarrassment of the
United States government, given the fact that not many other signatories to the treaty
have adopted the more liberal construction the American judiciary has given to the treaty.
See note 85 & accompanying text infra. See also Note, supra note 4, at 77. Given the need
both to protect the integrity of the United States in treaty negotiations and to uphold
the supremacy of federal statutes, the judicial conduct proposal described in the text ac-
companying notes 97-98 infra should be seriously considered as an alternative method of
judicial activity. The role of the judiciary should be to enforce federal laws, despite ob-
solescence, not to rewrite them in accordance with their own views. Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee
Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 370 F.2d 508, 515 (2d Cir. 1966), affd by an equally divided court,
390 U.S. 455 (1968).
7' This article provides:
(1) For the transporation of passengers the carrier must deliver a passenger
ticket which shall contain the following particulars:
a) The place and date of issue;
b) The place of departure and of destination;
c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may reserve the
right to alter the stopping places in case of necessity, and that if he exercises
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which is to contain, among other things,75 a warning that the transporta-
tion is subject to "the rules relating to liability."7 Article 3(2) warns that
the carrier cannot avail itself of the liability limitation if it accepts a
passenger without the passenger ticket being delivered." Courts in the
United States have found that the purpose of these two provisions, taken
together, is to enable the passenger to take his own precautions 78 to pre-
vent the serious consequences which flow from imposition of the
limitation .7 When this purpose is frustrated, the courts refuse to enforce
the limitation. The "late delivery" cases10 reason that receipt of a ticket
containing the warning after a certain point in the embarkation process
does not afford the passenger an adequate opportunity to take
precautions.8 Some cases focus on the warning contained in the ticket,82
contending that the warning itself is printed in such a manner so as to
be "virtually" invisible,' resulting in a similar denial of an opportunity
that right, the alteration shall not have the effect of depriving the transporta-
tion of its international character;
d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
e) A statement that the trangportation is subject to the rules relating to
liability established by this convention.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1).
" The "other items" the ticket is to contain include the place and date of issue, the
place of departure and destination, agreed stopping places, and the name and addresses
of the carrier or carriers. See id.
76 Id. art. 3(1)(e).
Id. art. 3(2).
The precautions a passenger could take to avoid the harsh consequences of the liability
limitation include acquiring additional insurance, Mertens v. The Flying Tiger Line, Inc.,
341 F.2d 851, 856-57 (2d Cir. 1965); Warren v. The Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494,
497-98 (9th Cir. 1965); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 253 F. Supp. 237, 239
(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aj'd by an equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455
(1968; Note, Aviation Law, supra note 19, at 864; bargaining with the airline for increased
liability (a right granted to the passenger by article 22(1) of the treaty, Warsaw Conven-
tion, supra note 1, art. 22(1)); or deciding not to take the flight, Mertens v. The Flying
Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851, 856-57 (2d Cir. 1965); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane,
S.p.A., 253 F. Supp. 237, 239 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), affid by an equally
divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
" Mertens v. The Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851, 856-57 (2d Cir. 1965); Warren
v. The Flying Tiger Line Inc., 352 F.2d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1965); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree
Italiane, S.p.A., 253 F. Supp. 237, 239 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), affid
by an equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
, Mertens v. The Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965); Warren v. The
Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
"' The Second Circuit stated that "[t]he delivery requirement of Article 3(2) would make
little sense if it could be satisfied by delivering the ticket to the passenger when the air-
craft was several thousand feet in the air." Mertens v. The Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341
F.2d 851, 857 (2d Cir. 1965).
1 DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 433 F. Supp. 1047 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Lisi v.
Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 370 F.2d 508 (2d
Cir. 1966), affd by an equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
' One court contended that references to the limitations were "camouflaged in Lillipu-
tian print" and that they were therefore "unnoticeable and unreadable." Lisi v. Alitalia-
Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 253 F. Supp. 237, 243 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir.
1966), aff'd by an equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
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for self-protection." The positive result of these interpretations is, once
again, the opportunity for plaintiffs to recover damages which reflect their
losses.
There are also many negative results. First, no other member nation,
except Canada, interprets articles 3(1) and 3(2) to disallow the liability
limitation in cases of late delivery or inconspicuous warnings.' The goal
of uniformity is therefore not obtained.8 Second, in the ticket delivery
cases, it is very difficult to determine how soon is soon enough to enable
the traveler to take precautionary measures.' Third, in the case of the
printed warning, until the tickets are altered, it is possible that no
passenger will be subjected to the liability limitation in United States
courts.88 Finally, that the United States and Canada are the only coun-
tries which intrepret article 3(2) in this manner demonstrates that judicial
activism is again at work.89
Willful Misconduct
The willful misconduct mode of avoidance is based on article 25 of the
treaty,' which prevents an airline from availing itself of the liability limita-
tion if either the carrier or its agent commits an act of "willful
misconduct." 1 Judges are often able to permit a plaintiff to recover
unrestricted amounts through a liberal interpretation of what constitutes
" Id. at 239.
' The Canadians, in Montreal Trust Co. v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, 12 Av. Cas. 17,197
(Montreal Sup. Ct. 1971), rev'd, 13 Av. Cas. 17,456 (Que. Ct. App. 1974), rev'd, 14 Av. Cas.
17,510 (Can. Sup. Ct. 1976), decided the case along the lines of the Lisi court. Mankiewicz,
supra note 67, at 730.
The goal of uniformity is disrupted when countries interpret clauses differently.
Mankiewicz, supra note 67, at 726-36.
The only guidelines given by the court are that it cannot be done when the aircraft
is already airborne, see note 81 supra, and that delivery must occur so as to "afford the
passenger a reasonable opportunity to take ... self-protective measures." Mertens v. The
Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851, 857 (2d Cir. 1965).
a After the Lisi case, the Montreal Agreement contained a requirement that the warn-
ing of the liability limitation be in 10-point type. Montreal Agreement, supra note 2. But
due to estimates of the low number of people who are aware of the limitation (less than
one-half, as reported in Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, spra note 3, at 535) this note contemplates
the possibility of future lack-of-notice litigation.
See note 73 & accompanying text supra.
o Article 25 provides:
1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this
convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his
willful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the
law of the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent
to willful misconduct.
2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said provi-
sions, if the damage is caused under the same circumstances by any agent
of the carrier acting within the scope of his employment.




willful misconduct. The advantage to this approach is that plaintiffs have
the potential to be more adequately compensated for their injuries than
if the liability limitation were strictly enforced. There are, however, a
number of negative results. First, judges in the United States use a lighter
standard for willful misconduct than judges of other member nations,92
and this promotes nonuniform litigation and defeats one of the treaty's
main purposes.93 Second, a liberal interpretation of willful misconduct con-
fuses the standard of care for other, non-Warsaw-limited tort cases.
94
Finally, by employing a standard which falls short of willful misconduct,
the judges are again engaging in judicial activism, the right to which is
questionable.95
JUDICIAL CONDUCT PROPOSAL
The three modes of avoidance discussed above are an example of over-
zealous judicial activism. Although the results achieved by the circumven-
tion of the liability limitation are attractive, the employment of the three
theories also creates the problems discussed in the previous section." This
' Mankiewicz, supra note 67, at 723, 725-26.
' See note 4 & accompanying text supra.
" Cases which involved circumstances which were of questionable willful misconduct
include LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir.) (plane crashed en
route to Rome; plaintiff successfully claimed Sabena's pilot deliberately misled the Rome
controller as to their position), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965); Koninklijke Luchtvaart
Maatschappij N.V. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v.'Tuller, 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir.) (failure
of crew to tell passengers where life jackets were and failure to communicate with carrier
to attempt rescue), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961); American Airlines, Inc. v. Ulen, 186
F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (violation of safety regulation requiring plane to be flown to 1,000
feet above highest obstacle in area). But see Wing Hang Bank, Ltd. v. Japan Air Lines,
357 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (item stolen from valuable cargo area; no willful misconduct
found on behalf of airline because value of item not known or made visible); Berner v.
British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965) (no willful miscon-
duct when pilot became confused and began to land from point he believed to be proper);
Berguido v. Eastern Airlines; Inc., 317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1963) (no willful misconduct found
when claimed pilot tried to make "sneak-in" landing and had delibertely flown below legal
minimums); Grey v. Ameican Airlines, Inc., 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955) (no willful miscon-
duct found in acts taken by pilot when plane in danger); Goepp v. American Overseas Airlines,
Inc., 281 A.D. 105, 117 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1952) (no willful misconduct when pilot failed to make
two qualifications flights), affjd mem., 305 N.Y. 830, 114 N.E.2d 37, cert. denied, 346 U.S.
874 (1953).
The willful misconduct cases cause difficulties because an act of willful misconduct is
more than gross negligence. The actor must, in addition to doing the act in question, have
intended the result that came about. Froman v. Pan Am. Airways, 284 A.D. 935, 135 N.Y.S.2d
619 (1954). Because of the low survival rate in aircraft disasters, it is illogical to contend
that the pilot intends to crash the plane. In a plane crash, 75% of the passengers will
die and 25% will be injured. 1 L. KREINDLER, supra note 9, S 12B.02[4].
" See note 73 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 68, 70, 72, 86, & 92-94 & accompanying text supra. See also Benjamins v.
British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 920 (2d Cir. 1978) (VanGraafeilan, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 370 F.2d 508,
515 (2d Cir. 1966) (Moore, J., dissenting), affd by an equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455
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section, in order to avoid those problems, will therefore suggest a more
appropriate mode of conduct.
The proposed conduct for the judiciary is uniform adherence to the
treaty's liability limitation. Although this will cause the distasteful result
of inadequate recoveries, it will halt the equally impermissible excesses
of the judicial branch and restore some certainty to the litigation of
recovery questions. This conduct is suggested because it is the job of
the executive, not the judiciary, to make treaties," and the judges are
compelled by the Constitution to uphold those treaties. 8 If there is to
be an amendment of the Warsaw Convention's recovery system (which
this note supports), its creation should be and is the province of the ex-
ecutive branch.
A PROPOSED REVISION OF THE RECOVERY SYSTEM
In order for a renegotiation of Warsaw Convention liability to be suc-
cessful, the United States should adopt two nonnegotiable premises. The
first premise is that every United States citizen who flies abroad,
regardless of the flight's point of origin, stopover, or termination," should
be financially protected with an assurance of adequate compensation where
the United States has jurisdiction to require such a result. The second
premise is that the newer, nongovernmentally owned airlines"0 should
be afforded the same opportunity for development which was enjoyed
by their larger competitors in the early decades of this century. This final
section will discuss the justifications for, problems with, and implemen-
(1968); Swan, The Constitutional Power to Terminate Treaties: Who, When and Why, 6 YALE
STUD. WORLD PUBL. ORD. 159 (1979).
11 See note 73 supra.
98 Id.
The point of origin, stopover, or termination of the flight determines liability under
the Montreal Agreement. Montreal Agreement, supra note 2.
'1 The reasons for the nongovernment distinction is that most foreign carriers engaged
in international transport are owned by the government of the country under whose flag
they fly. Note, Aviation Law, supra note 19, at 865. This means that any payment for damages
is derived from the public funds. There is no justification to limit liability when a foreign
government is the defendant who is ultimately protected. Id. Another justification for pro-
tecting only non-government-owned international carriers is that fewer airlines will be able
to avail themselves of a liability limitation, thereby making the proposed revision of the
recovery system more efficient to administer.
There are, of course, objections to this type of system. The smaller, less developed na-
tions, contend that a system with even some type of limited liability would impose great
insurance costs upon them, Hickey, supra note 9, at 611, thus making economic growth
impossible, id. The question asked at the conference which resulted in the Montreal Agree-
ment was why should the peasant be required to pay for the comfort of a king? See Lowenfeld
& Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 565. The smaller countries contend that only passengers
from richer countries expect higher recoveries, and that they should not be made to suffer
the additional expense just to allow more wealthy travelers to take advantage of increased




tation of a system which both financially protects American travelers and
fosters the development of the non-government-owned airlines.
Justifications for Financial Protection and Development
The desire to protect American citizens financially through an assurance
of adequate compensation is not foreign to Warsaw Convention
negotiations."' When the Guatemala Protocol'" was drafted, the goal of
the United States delegation was to protect financially at least eighty
percent of American travelers. 03 In addition to this historical expression
of American policy, another justification for financially protecting United
States citizens is that Americans comprise more than one-half of the total
number of international air travelers.' International airlines should ac-
commodate the interests of this profit source by accepting greater
liability."5
Making provisions to aid the development of newly organized, non-
government-owned airlines is also justifiable. Whereas many of the foreign
flag airlines are government owned"' and therefore have access to the
public coffers for payment of large claims,"7 newly organized airlines that
lack government backing are in a position analogous to that of the entire
airline industry in 1929.0° If it is determined that creation and develop-
"' See note 103 & accompanying text infra. Desiring to protect American citizens is also
not an unusual contention for scholars who write on Warsaw Convention issues. See 1 L.
KREINDLER, supra note 9; 2 J. KENNELLY, supra note 3, ch. 7, at 5; Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 3, at 565.
11" ICAO Doc. No. 8878-L.C. 161-162 (1970) (United States not a signatory at time of this
writing). For a discussion on the Guatemala Protocol, see 1 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, supra
note 9, S 11:20; 1 L. KREINDLER, supra note 9, § 12; Boyle, supra note 9; Kreindler, supra
note 26.
. "I The negotiations fell far short of that figure. The liability limitation of $100,000 leaves
over 60/o of the United States travelers without an opportunity to recover an amount
which actually reflects their pecuniary loss. 1 L. KREINDLER, supra note 9, S 12B.02[b].
10, See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 514.
101 For additional arguments why the airlines should be willing to accept greater liabil-
ity, see note 26 supra.
104 See note 100 supra.
107 Id.
"' The similarity of today's non-government-owned airlines with the entire industry in
1929 is based both on financial status and safety records. Because new airlines are more
likely to purchase used equipment, A. Altman, The Domestic Airline Industry (March 1978)
(unpublished senior thesis in Union College Library, Schenectady, N.Y.), and a smaller air-
craft, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASS'N, supra note 26, at 20-53, both of which are less
safe, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, ANNUAL REVIEW OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATA
48 (1978), their insurance costs are likely to be much higher, 3 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE,
supra note 9, S 22:4, at 14-15. Without the public treasury to pay claims, unlimited liability
could bankrupt a privately owned infant airline. This was the worry of the drafters when
the original treaty was negotiated. See notes 3-4 & accompanying text supra. Privately
owned new airlines, therefore, have the financial difficulties of their predecessors. The
new airlines, unless they are owned by a large corporation which can afford to purchase
new, large aircraft, also have the safety problems encountered by the industry in 1929.
See A. Altman, supra.
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ment of new, non-government-supported airlines is desirable,1" then, given
the tremendous costs of establishing a new airline,"' some type of finan-
cial incentive should be available for those attempting to enter the
industry."'
There are, however, arguments which might justify the imposition of
unlimited liability upon even the new, fledgling, airlines. If they are able
to obtain insurance coverage for unlimited liability in the event of a crash,
it might be best for all airlines to be subjected to unlimited recoveries.
Further, if potential passengers are informed of the new airline's limited
liability, they might be discouraged from traveling on that airline, thereby
threatening the airline's potential for success. Since it is unknown whether
the difference in insurance premiums for a new airline with limited liability
would be enough to charge a signficiantly lower rate than the airlines
with unlimited liability and thus to combat this negative effect, the
possibility of unlimited liability for all airlines is not rejected. Never-
theless, liability is not recommended for the newly established non-
government airlines, due to the potential financial difficulties presented
by such a system."' Some system must therefore be developed whereby
the new, non-government-owned airlines are allowed to mature financial-
ly before being asked to shoulder the burden of increased or unlimited
liability.
The Problems of Financial Protection
There are two sets of problems which arise from the two premises.
The first set includes whether liability should be limited or unlimited"'
and whether citizens other than Americans will be entitled to avail
themselves of the new recovery system."' The second set of problems
is less vexing and is procedurally oriented. These problems concern ques-
tions such as the method for calculating damages;1 5 whether, if the limit
,0 This note contends that development of new airlines is desirable because it grants
passengers greater freedom in deciding with which carrier to fly and at what time to travel.
"I Entrance into what is termed the "long-haul market" (as opposed to local or regional
markets) is expensive, involving outlays for equipment, personnel training, and promotion.
A. Altman, supra note 108. For example, in 1978, Braniff Airlines, in an attempt to com-
pete effectively with the other carriers in its class, purchased 90 Boeing 727's at a cost
of $12.5 million each. BRANIFF AIRLINES 1978 ANNUAL REPORT. Entry into the long-haul
markets is usually reserved for the extremely well-to-do firms. A. Altman, supra note 108.
Nevertheless, some airlines could start out financially capable of sustaining unlimited liability.
If this is so, then they should be subject to the unlimited liability suggested by note 157 infra.
, See note 108 supra.
,, For a dis-ussion of the financial difficulties presented by unlimited liability for privately
owned, newly established airlines, see note 108 supra.
See notes 118-31 & accompanying text infra.
,, See notes 132-35 & accompanying text infra.
", See text accompanying notes 136-37 infra.
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were simply increased, the new limit would be breakable;... and what to
do about nonuniform recovery in Warsaw Convention suits.'17 In this sec-
tion, each of these difficulties is discussed and some solutions are offered.
In order to implement a more modern system of recovery, the primary
determination must be whether to increase the liability limitation substan-
tially or to abandon the concept of limited recovery completely. This note
argues that, at least for United States citizens, unlimited liability is the
preferable system. The idea of unlimited liability is in accord with tradi-
tional notions of American tort law."8 The only limitation is the degree
of fault of the actor."' Since courts throughout the world are accustomed
to dealing with the concepts of negligence and fault,"' those principles
would not be unfamiliar to them if employed to determine damages in
Warsaw Convention suits. Unlimited liability also guarantees each
American passenger on an international flight the availability of just com-
pensation for an air accident."'
Airlines argue that unlimited liability presents grave problems. There
is an increased difficulty in calculation of insurance premiums"' and an
almost certain fare increase." Potential investors may shy away from
the airlines for fear of the increased liability."u These difficulties, however,
are not of the magnitude which the airlines suggest.3 Insurance premiums
may be established for unlimited liability just as for limited liability."6
The fare increase, if it were to reflect solely the insurance cost of unlimited
liability, would be less than one dollar for the established airlines." It
is also unlikely that a change in potential liability would drive away
investors." The problems which allegedly arise from unlimited liability
are minimal.
,,O See text accompanying notes 13842 infra.
' See Hickey, supra note 9, at 604.
1,8 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS S 5, at 22-23 (4th ed. 1971).
11 Id.
,20 A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 590-780 (2d ed. 1977); cf.
Mankiewicz, supra note 67, at 73746 (explaining difference between common law and civil
law countries).
"' The guarantee of just compensation would have to be limited to an amount not in
excess of the airline's assets. That is not a terrible limit, however, since the four major
domestic carriers have each had assets averaging $7 billion over the past five years. See
note 157 infra.
12 See note 20 supra.
' See note 26 supra.
21 The potential hesitancy of investors was one of the reasons which led to the imposi-
tion of the liability limitation in 1929. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 499.
22 See note 26 supra; notes 126-27 & accompanying text infra.
12 Insurance premiums are in effect for the domestic airlines, see generally 1 L.
KREINDLER, su-pra note 9, S 12B.01, which are subject to unlimited liability. See note 26 supra.
This note therefore assumes that the international carriers could also receive insurance
for unlimited liability.
I? See note 26 supra.
1 The domestic airlines have investors while shouldering unlimited liability. It is therefore




The advantages of a greatly increased liability limit accrue mostly to
the airline industry. Their liability would not be based on fault.'" The
certainty in the purchase of insurance and uniformity of recovery would
be restored.'" The benefit to the passenger would be a greater opportunity
for just compensation. The increased opportunity for adequate recoveries
is the sole advantage to be gained by passengers. Problems arise, however,
from limiting liability. Some plaintiffs will still be unable to recover an
amount which represents their actual loss. Also, courts might still try
to circumvent the liability limitation. Finally, the major airlines would
still be receiving a benefit of artificially low liability. An alternative
method of recovery for United States citizens when the United States
has jurisdiction"3 ' should be considered.
The Warsaw Convention's liability limitation should therefore be
abolished. While not every country should be required to guarantee
unlimited liability for its citizens, United States citizens, who comprise
more than one-half of the international air traveling public,'" should be
guaranteed unlimited liability.13 If other countries feel their citizens need
this type of financial protection and their carriers can afford unlimited
liability, 34 then the proposed United States system can either be adopted
completely or modified to suit their particular needs. For countries that
still believe in a system of limited liability, the limit should be raised
to reflect the current world economic situation."
There are solutions to the procedural problem of damage calculation
and to the controversy over a breakable or nonbreakable limit. The
pecuniary loss standard encompassed in most wrongful death statutes
can be employed to determine damages."'6 The loss can be measured with
'" There is no reason why, if a limitation is still in effect, the present system which
disregards fault and citizenship should not continue. It has basically worked, except for
a number of ruptures caused by the United States. See generally notes 51-97 & accompany-
ing text supra.
' See note 20 supra.
,a, When there is no United States jurisdiction, an American citizen will be forced to
sue in a foreign court, and therefore will be subject to foreign laws. Lack of United States
jurisdiction, however, is infrequent in an air accident, since there are few carriers which
are not present for jurisdictional purposes in some state. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra
note 3, at 524.
' Id. at 514.
'" Americans should receive unlimited liability because they have the economic power
to demand compensation commensurate with their injuries. See notes 104-05 & accompany-
ing text supra. Moreover, if higher recoveries were available only for American citizens,
those airlines which carried mainly non-Americans would be unaffected by the increased
recoveries. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 565.
,' The choice of limited or unlimited liability is not necessarily made on the govern-
ment's belief that its citizens have a right to unlimited liability. Rather, because most of
the airlines outside the United States are government-owned, see note 100 .upra, the liability
decision reflects the government's desire to avoid imposing unlimited liability upon itself.
'" See notes 164-74 & accompanying text infra.
131 2 J. KENNELLY, supra note 3, ch. 7. at 5.
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actuarial tables. 37 Whether the new limitation on liability to non-United
States citizens can be exceeded has been debated since the conferences
on the Hague Protocol. '38 The controversy centers around whether an
airline should be permitted to avail itself of the liability limitation despite
an act of willful misconduct,"9 the failure to deliver a ticket,4 ' or lack
of notice concerning the limitation."' There has been little United States
support for an unbreakable limit,' but because American citizens will
seldom be affected by a decision for a breakable or unbreakable limit,
the determination should be left to the governments of the world.1 1
Implementation of a System for Financial Protection and Development
To satisfy modern demands for increased airline liability, this note sug-
gests a system of recovery from air accidents based on nationality. It
consists of three separate modes of recovery: unlimited compensation for
United States citizens from major.4 4 and government-owned smaller
airlines,'41 greatly increased liability limitations for other citizens, '46 and
limited recoveries from privately owned, newly developing airlines
regardless of citizenship.14'7 Because a tripartite compensation scheme has
never before been proposed'" or employed, the following discussion ex-
amines methods of operations' and means for insuring compliance.'5
Implementation of a system for the unlimited protection of all United
States citizens who fly abroad involves a slight rise in the insurance ex-
pense incurred by airlines. 1 ' This will be reflected in an equally impercep-
,I, Id. at 25.
138 Hickey, supra note 9, at 605.
139 See notes 90-95 & accompanying text supra.
,, See notes 74-77 & 85-89 & accompanying text supra.
' See notes 80-84 & accompanying text supra.
"' Hickey, supra note 9, at 604.
"1 No solution is offered here for the "problem" of nonuniform recovery because it ac-
tually should not be considered a problem. Recovery has never been uniform in Warsaw
Convention suits in that complaining parties do not receive similar compensation for similar
claims. 1 L. KREINDLER, supra note 9, S 11.02[2]. Because the treaty provides for the use of
local laws in a number of situations, Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, arts. 22(1), 25(1),
28(2), it seems that the drafters themselves never intended uniformity in recovery. Finally,
nonuniform recovery is not a terribly distasteful offense.
"I For a definition of a major airline which would be subject to unlimited liability, see
note 157 infra.
,, See note 100 supra; notes 151-72 & accompanying text infra.
,, See notes 173-80 & accompanying text infra.
See notes 175-76 & accompanying text infra.
,4 Methods of recovery have, however, been suggested which allow for higher recoveries
by- United States citizens, see, e.g., Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 565, and
which have suggested elimination of the willful misconduct clause, thus allowing each na-
tion to determine the just compensation for its citizens, Tompkins, Limitation of Liability
by Treaty and Statute, 36 J. AIR L. & COM. 421, 434 (1970).
' See notes 151-56, 158-62, & 164-75 & accompanying text infra
See notes 157, 168-74, & 176 & accompanying text infra.
,I, See note 26 supra.
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tible increase in the price of plane tickets bought by Americans for foreign
air travel. ' The revenues received from the fare increase can be pooled
in a common insurance fund'" for all airlines that carry United States
citizens. When an air accident occurs, full and just compensation can be
derived from the fund."M Unlimited liability for international carriers,
which have a greater number of companies among whom the insurance
costs can be shared,'" would not cause financial ruin; the domestic airlines,
despite their exposure to unlimited liability, are among the most successful
industries in the world.15 This suggested compensation system should not
be optional for the international carriers; rather, to insure protection of
every American who travels abroad by air, compliance with its terms
should be made a prerequisite to carrying United States citizens. It should
be enforced by congressional legislation which would denote those airlines
subject to its terms and contain a penalty for noncompliance which would
allow for revocation of the airline's license to do business within the United
States.'5
" See generally id. The domestic airlines are used as a comparison for insurance costs
because the United States is the country whose citizens make the greatest use of air transpor-
tation. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 514. Other countries employ primarily
rail transport. The domestic airlines therefore form the system most similar to the inter-
national air transport network.
'5 For a similar system, see Boyle, supra note 9, at 127-28. This proposed system of
insurance is unique in that normally each airline has its own insurance company for every
item it must insure (the aircraft itself, injury to the crew, and injury to the passengers),
3 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, supra note 9, S 22:4. The airlines are not, therefore, normally self-
insurers. This self-insurance system is proposed for efficiency and certainty. If the airlines
lose a claim, compensation will be provided from this fund without the necessity of dealing
with an intermediary insurance company. Because this fund will be used only for interna-
tional air accidents, each airline will always be aware of the amount available for compen-
sation in the event of an air accident. A low level of funds, due to a greater number of
recoveries than anticipated, will warn the airlines of the need to charge more for each
international passenger so as to assure adequate compensation.
'" As mentioned in note 26 supra, recoveries should average fewer than 186 persons
per year, a figure that probably will decrease as airline safety continues to improve. Special
ICAO Meeting on Limits For Passengers Under the Warsaw Convention and Hague Pro-
tocol, ICAO Doc. No. 8584-L.C.154-1, at 142 (1966). Since the average recovery for non-Warsaw
Convention suits is now in excess of $200,000, 1 L. KREINDLER, supra note 9, S 12B.02[b,
the total yearly expenditure from the fund, assuming 186 recoveries of $300,000 each, would
be $5,800,000.
'' See note 45 supra.
" Kreindler, supra note 26, at 135. See also note 157 infra.
157 The statute could require that any air carrier, foreign or domestic, which has flown
an average of 10 billion passenger miles per year over the past five years, or has carried
an average of 50 United States citizens per year over the past five years, or has earned
an average of $20 million worth of profits per year over the past five years, or has con-
ducted business which has averaged $1 billion per year over the past five years, or has
possessed assets which have averaged $1 billion per year over the past five years would
be subject to unlimited liability in the event of an air accident causing the death or injury
of a United States citizen.
The above-mentioned figures are suggested solely for purposes of discussion. The quan-
tities are based on two items. The first consists of the annual reports for the years 1976
through 1979 of four of the major domestic airlines-Delta, Eastern, American, and TWA.
The second item is MOODY'S TRANSPORTATION MANUAL for the years 1975 through 1979.
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Moody's provided information on six major international carriers-KLM Royal Dutch
Airlines, Deutsche Lufthansa Airlines, Air Canada, Japan Airlines, Swiss Air, and SAS
(Scandinavian Airlines Systems). A survey of their total business revenues, passenger miles
flown, and assets revealed that, given the above-mentioned figures, each airline would be
subject to the statute. See MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC., 1976 MOODY'S TRANSPORTATION
MANUAL 1207-08, 1344, 1367-71 [hereinafter cited as MOODY'S]; id. 1977 MOODY'S, at 909-10,
1051-52, 1056-57, 1069, 1072; id. 1978 MOODY'S, at 909-10, 1053-54, 1058-59, 1070, 1073-74; id.
1979 MOODrS, at 909-10, 1061, 1064-66, 1076-78; id- 1980 MOODyS, at 1209-10, 1438, 1442-44,
1454-56.
The domestic airlines were used for comparison because they are subjected to unlimited
liability. See note 26 supra. The five-year figure was employed because that is the amount
of time over which Delaware corporation law values a business. Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218 (Del. 1975); Piemonte v. New Boston
Garden Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 387 N.E.2d 1145 (1979).
This statute might not be necessary. Because this note proposes to alter only the recovery
system of the Warsaw Convention, and no other aspects, the broad jurisdictional grants
of the treaty are maintained. The section that permits the airline to claim limited liability
will be replaced by a section that dictates which airlines can claim limited liability and
when. The treaty grants jurisdiction where the carrier is domiciled, where the carrier has
its principle place of business, where the carrier has a place of business through which
the arrangements were made for passage, and at the destination contained in the ticket.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28. As it now stands, therefore, it is not difficult
to be able to sue a carrier in the United States. 1 L. KREINDLER, supra note 9, S 12B.04[1];
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 524. The statute is suggested, however, for
two reasons. First, it would permit unlimited recovery from those airlines to which it ap-
plies. Second, it demonstrates to the airlines the importance to the United States govern-
ment of adequate compensation for American passengers injured or killed in air accidents.
There might also be a question of what to do in case an alien sues in a United States
court under the treaty with the proposed revisions. Would he be bound by the liability
limitation of his native land, or allowed to sue for unlimited liability under the new law
in the United States? A similar situation, where a lower limit of liability might be in force
depending on the law applied by the court, was present in In re Paris Air Crash of March
3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975). There, the court decided not to apply foreign
law if it resulted in a recovery which would be different from the recovery as a result
of the application of American law. Id. at 743. This note suggests following the Paris court
in applying United States law. Some people may argue that this decision might increase
litigation in the United States courts by encouraging aliens to bring suits in the United
States. This will not happen, however, because this note suggests only revision of the
recovery system, not of other elements of the treaty. The jurisdictional elements of the
treaty, Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28, should be retained. The jurisdiction of
the United States courts, therefore, will not be increased, nor will persons who were not
previously permitted by the treaty to sue in United States courts be allowed to sue in
the United States courts with the proposed law.
Some hypothetical situations are presented below to demonstrate how the new recovery
system will operate. Three factors should be kept in mind. First, there will be a new sec-
tion in the treaty which states that, absent supplemental recovery statutes (like the one
proposed for the United States supra) there will be a new, higher recovery limitation. For
discussion purposes, assume the new liability limitation is $50,000. Second, the original
jurisdictional allowances of the Warsaw Convention remain in force. Third, privately owned
fledgling airlines will also have a liability limitation. For discussion purposes, assume the
liability limitation is $8,300.
One group of situations involves an American citizen flying after the United States passes
the proposed statute:
1. A, an American citizen, flies on Air France from New York to Paris. Air France
has offices in New York and has earned an average of $30 million worth of profits a year
over the past five years and therefore is subject to the statute. If his plane crashes, A
will be able to sue in the United States and Air France will have unlimited liability.
2. A, an American citizen, flies Air Sudan from Paris to London. Air Sudan is government-
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There remains, however, the problem of liability for airlines that carry
American passengers but do no business that would subject them to the
jurisdiction of United States courts." Because it is likely that few, if any,
of those carriers would choose a system of unlimited liability and that
the United States would be unable to require them to adopt it,159 the
passengers transported by those carriers should be notified of the limited
liability. 6 The task may be performed by any public interest group, air-
port, or airline. 6' Information on limited liability should be made conspic-
owned, but has no United States connections which would subject it to the statute. If A's
plane crashes, Air Sudan will not have unlimited liability unless Air Sudan agrees to such
a system. Rather, since Air Sudan is government-owned, the new treaty limits A's recovery
to $50,000.
3. A, an American citizen, flies Privately-Owned airline from Cairo to Jerusalem.
Privately-Owned is a nongovernment airline which has just recently bought its first plane.
If A's plane crashes, A will be limited to $8,300 because the airline is a privately owned
fledgling airline.
A second group of situations involves a foreign citizen whose country decides not to
enact an unlimited liability statute, but instead adheres to the $50,000 liability limitation:
1. F, a French citizen, flies Air France from Paris to London. If F's plane crashes,
since France has not enacted an unlimited liability statute, F's recovery will be limited
to $50,000.
2. F, a French citizen, flies Privately-Owned airline from Cairo to Jerusalem. Since the
airline is privately owned and in its infancy, F's recovery is limited to $8,300.
3. F, a French citizen, flies Pan Am from Paris to New York. Pan Am is domiciled
in the United States, therefore F, if his plane crashes, has the right to sue in a United
States court. Because of the case of In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp.
732 (C.D. Cal. 1975), F will not be subjected to French law because it would result in a
recovery which would be different from the recovery as a result of the application of
American law (i.e., the recovery under French law would be limited to $50,000, but the
recovery under United States would be unlimited). F's recovery would be unlimited.
" Carriers that would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States through
the events mentioned in note 157 supra would not be forced, through the economic need
to survive, to accept unlimited liability.
'" The United States would have no jurisdictional power over airlines which do no business
within the United States. The United States therefore lacks official sanctions to force com-
pliance with an unlimited liability statute.
16 Notification is important because the passenger should, if possible, be able to choose
to travel with an airline whose liability is unlimited. It is also essential because fewer
than one-half of one percent of all international travelers are aware of the limit. See Lowenfeld
& Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 535 (quoting Senator Homer Capehart). That ignorance
is due in large part to the fact that most United States passengers are accustomed to
traveling on domestic airlines, which have no liability limitation, and they fail to recognize
the difference between domestic and international flights. Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane,
S.p.A., 370 F.2d 508, 513 (2d Cir. 1966), affd by an equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
The airlines provide no extra help in this area, since they use the same ticket for both
national and international passage. 1 L. KREINDLER, supra note 9, S 11.05[2].
663 The suggestion of a public interest group to provide information about the liability
limitation is justified by the low rate of awareness. See note 160 supra. Airlines subject
to unlimited liability would be interested in providing information because they might be
able to attract customers from the limited liability airlines. Airports might want to pro-
vide information on which airlines have unlimited liability to avoid liability themselves.
This is because, with the present system of limited airline liability, if the air traffic con-
troller is negligent, then the government, whose liability is unlimited, pays a large majority
of the judgment that exceeds the liability limitation. 2 J. KENNELLY, supra note 3, ch. 7,
at 18; Kreindler, supra note 26, at 133-34. This is similar to the manufacturer's liability
problem discussed in notes 33-36 & accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 57:297
WARSAW CONVENTION
uously available where those airlines arrange flight reservations. The
notice of restricted recovery should be accompanied by a list of airlines
that are subject to unlimited liability. Notification of liability limits ap-
pears to be the only way to protect American citizens when United States
courts have no jurisdiction over the international carrier to enforce
unlimited liability.6
2
An increase in the limitation on liability would eliminate the obsolete
element of the Warsaw Convention.'3 The countries that choose an in-
crease in the limitation would first have to decide on an agreeable figure
for the new recovery restriction. Before the agreement could be arranged,
an agency familiar with the international air transportation system'" would
have to collect and study data on recoveries for air accidents1 15 and ascer-
tain the amount which would insure adequate compensation.'" That figure
would be the new liability limitation.167 The new limit, however, should
not remain static." Provisions should be made for a periodic mandatory
increase6 9 to reflect alterations in the world economic situation."' Those
increases should be tied to an acknowledged world economic indicator,'71
thus insuring that no single country could force an increase not desired
A problem could arise if a passenger is forced to procure transportation with an airline
whose liability is limited yet which possesses the sole rights to the particular route of
travel the traveler desires. But, in all likelihood, the airline with the sole rights to a par-
ticular route would be too small to be subject to unlimited liability. A. Altman, supra note
108. If it is not too small, the proposed financial standards, see note 157 supra, could sub-
ject it to greatly increased liability.
63 The limitation, imposed when the airline industry was in its infancy and vulnerable
to excessive claims, see notes 3-4 & accompanying text supra, is no longer justified due
to the present financial status of the airline industry.
'" The agency in charge of accumulating the financial information could be the Interna-
tional Air Transport Association (IATA), which routinely collects data on financial situa-
tions of airlines and recoveries in the handbook cited in note 26 supra. Another organiza-
tion which could gather the data required is the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), which collected the financial data for the Montreal Convention, 1 L. KREINDLER,
supra note 9, S 12B.02[4].
"6 The collection of data on recoveries for air accidents was used in the Montreal Agree-
ment negotiations. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 552-53.
'6 The new amount could be an average of recoveries or a more intricate combination
of the general economic situation and average recoveries.
6, Although the idea of a liability limitation has not received much support in this coun-
try, other nations (mostly third world countries) do support such a system of recovery.
Hickey, supra note 9, at 610. Therefore, if allowing limited liability is necessary for a new
treaty, it must be available for those nations that desire it for their citizens.
I68 If the new limit remained static, there would remain the problem that sometime in
the future, the new limit would also become outdated and need revisions.
69 A similar provision for a periodic mandatory increase is contained in the Guatemala
Protocol, supra note 2. For a more extensive discussion of this proposal, see Boyle, supra
note 9, at 126-28.
1I The Guatemala Protocol, supra note 2, contains a provision for a yearly update of
the liability limitation of $2,500. 1 L. KREINDLER, supra, note 9, S 12B.03[4].
" The price of gold could be used as the world economic indicator. Gold is suggested
because that is the standard upon which the orignial liability limitation was based. 2 J.
KENNELLY, supra note 3, ch. 7, at 4.
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by the others." Because no statutory system of enforcement is available,"
enforcement of this new liability increase should be accomplished through
the courts of the countries that become signatories to the new treaty,
which is the compliance method employed by the Warsaw Convention."4
To establish this system, the participating countries should hold a con-
ference to decide how often and by how much the liability limitation should
be increased.
The implementation of a system to insure continued development of
fledgling, privately owned airlines should include limitation of liability
regardless of citizenship. A system should be developed for fledgling
airlines similar to the one that fostered the growth of the now-established
airlines. There should not be the option in this situation for the individual
countries to require unlimited liability from the fledgling airlines because,
if a country were permitted to demand unlimited liability from infant
airlines, either no new airlines would come into existence or, if they did
manage to begin, one accident could be ruinous. The International Air
Transport Association should decide on a level of financial stability below
which an airline might avail itself of limited liability.17 5 Enforcement by
"72 The advantages of a system which increases the limitation on liability are that vic-
tims or their survivors are more justly compenated for air accidents, while the airlines
are permitted to maintain their limited liability. The smaller airlines can also participate
in this system. They will remain subject to very limited liability until they reach a certain
level of growth. Then, depending on the passenger's nationality, either their liability will
be increased to the new limit and become subject to the periodic revisions, or their limita-
tion will be eliminated. See also note 175 infra.
' There is no international law enforcement system. The International Court of Justice,
established by the United Nations, has no enforcement powers in the form of sanctions.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
A CHANGING WORLD 57 (E. Collins ed. 1970).
"' The governments of the world ratified the treaty, yet its enforcement was left to
the local courts. Mankiewicz, supra note 67, at 721. Because United States treaties are
the supreme law of the land, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, the United States courts were to
apply the Convention's principles. Note, supra note 4, at 73-74.
,' The small airlines would be further divided into categories which represent their in-
dustrial growth. A measure of that growth could be a combination of the factors suggested
as elements of the statute proposed in note 157 supra. Airlines in primary stages of develop-
ment can be allowed the lowest liability limitation. Carriers that exhibit more extensive
growth can be subjected to increased, yet restricted liability. The amount of compensation
that may be attained from those airlines could be a figure the ICAO thinks that the carrier
can adequately manage given both its monetary position and its potential for future growth.
As an airline matures, it can be subjected to greater liability commensurate with its develop-
ment. For elements which might be considered growth indicators, see note 157 supra. Ideally,
each airline could eventually achieve a level of financial stability that would enable it to
bear unlimited liability for its injured American passengers.
While an airline is at an underdeveloped stage and is permitted to employ the recovery
restrictions, it should be the task of a public interest group, airport, or airline to inform
United States citizens of the limited liability of these airlines, so the decision to contract
the transportation with them can be made with the knowledge that, in case of injury or
death in an air accident, the airline's liability will be limited to a certain amount. For an
explanation why those three parties are suggested to provide the information on limited
liability, see note 161 supra.
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the International Air Transport Association of the provisions applying
to the newly developing non-government-owned airlines should be han-
dled by the local courts."" Unlike the present, easily avoided liability limita-
tion, this new restriction should be strictly enforced in the absence of
a showing of truly willful misconduct, failure to deliver a ticket, or lack
of notice concerning the limitation. Strict enforcement is necessary if the
desired goal of eventually subjecting these new carriers to unlimited liabil-
ity is to be achieved.
Although the results of this tripartite system of recovery may be
nonuniform compensation and administrative difficulty,'77 the newer
system attains more desirable results than the present method of com-
pensation in Warsaw Convention suits. The proposed system meets the
demand for adequate compensation for injuries or death. Revisions of the
amount are automatic,"8 thus eliminating the need for noncompliance as
a method for forcing an increase. 9 Finally, since the proposed system
reflects the present financial status of the international airline industry,
it brings the Warsaw Convention up to date with the industry it controls.
CONCLUSION
The Warsaw Convention successfully fostered the development of the
airline industry through accident liability limitations. 80 Despite substan-
tial achievement of its purposes, however, the liability limitation remains
in force. For the past twenty years, the American judiciary has demon-
strated an increasingly hostile attitude toward the liability limitation and
has discovered ingenious methods for circumventing its imposition.
Two of the most popular modes of avoidance are based upon the treaty.
The first treaty-based method is willful misconduct. The court relieves
the plaintiff of the liability limitation by finding an act of willful miscon-
duct when the deed does not display all the elements of willful miscon-
duct. The second method for circumventing the limitation which comes
from the treaty is a finding either that a ticket was not delivered soon
17 For reasons why enforcement is left to the local courts, see notes 173-74 & accompa-
nying text supra.
11 The administrative difficulties would be in the following areas: First, when a plane
crashes, the citizenship of each passenger must be determined. Second, before an airline
carries United States citizens (or the citizens of any other country which elects to enforce
unlimited liability) it must have its economic status determined so its passengers may become
aware of its level of liability. Third, citizenship will become important in determining both
recovery levels and ticket prices. Fourth, due to the rapid changes inherent in the world
economy, the status of airlines as to recoveries could be constantly changing.
See notes 169-70 & accompanying text supra.
' The United States threatened noncompliance, and in fact practiced it, to force negotia-
tion of the Montreal Agreement, supra note 2. 2 J. KENNELLY, supra note 3, ch. 7, at 33-34.
" Reed v. Wiser, 414 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 555 F.2d 1079
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); 2 J. KENNELLY, supra note 3, ch. 7, at 5; 1 S. SPEISER
& C. KRAUSE, supra note 9, 5 11:4.
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enough or that the ticket contained an inadequate warning of the liability
limitation. A third mode of avoidance is based on contract principles and
state wrongful death law. This theory allows the plaintiff unlimited com-
pensation by reasoning that only the passenger and the airline contract
to limit the carrier's liability, and therefore that the passenger's survivors
are not in privity with the airline and are not bound by the contract's
terms. Although these theories achieve desirable results, their
methodology is excessive judicial activism and they create more problems
than they solve. Consequently, this note suggests a mode of judicial con-
duct whereby the judiciary strictly enforces the liability limitation. This
will return the judiciary to its proper role as the enforcer of treaties made
by the executive branch.
The growing activity of the American courts is a signal to the executive
branch of the United States government that a new method of recovery
for international air accidents must be negotiated. Although the three
modes of avoidance achieve desirable results, excessive judicial activism
cannot be condoned. A new system under which recovery is based on
the nationality of the victim and the economic status of the airline can
be devised. The United States should pass a statute requiring certain
carriers which possess a certain level of financial stability to be subject
to unlimited liability for any death or injury suffered by any United States
citizen coming within the jurisdiction of the United States courts. Any
foreign citizen coming within the jurisdiction of the American courts would
also be afforded unlimited liability. Other countries also could pass a
similar statute granting the possibility of unlimited recoveries. If other
countries still desire a limitation, however, it should be increased beyond
the current figures set by the various treaties. The new limit should also
correspond to the stage of economic development of the particular airline.
Privately owned, newly established carriers should have a lower liability
limitation than those which are either government operated or financially
well established. This new system, based on the airline's level of economic
development, is equitable for victims, airlines, and governments and
reflects the high level of air transportation development.
SUSAN SCHNEIDER LEWIN
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